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ABSTRACT
Background Heat illness in the Armed Forces is consid-
ered preventable. The UK military relies upon dual
Command and Medical reporting for case ascertainment,
investigation of serious incidents and improvement of pre-
ventive practices and policy. This process could be vulner-
able to under-reporting.
Objectives To establish whether heat illness in the
British Army has been under-reported, by reviewing con-
cordance of reporting to the Army Incident Notiﬁcation
Cell (AINC) and the Army Health Unit (AHU) and to
characterise the burden of heat illness reported by these
means.
Methods Analysis of anonymised reporting databases
held by the AHU and AINC, for the period 2009–2013.
Results 565 unique cases of heat illness were identiﬁed.
Annual concordance of reporting ranged from 9.6% to
16.5%. The overall rate was 13.3%. July was the month
with the greatest number of heat illness reports (24.4% of
total reporting) and the highest concordance rate (30%).
Reports of heat illness from the UK (n=343) exceeded over-
seas notiﬁcations (n=221) and showed better concordance
(17.1% vs 12.8%). The annual rate of reported heat illness
varied widely, being greater in full-time than reservist per-
sonnel (87 vs 23 per100 000) and highest in full-time
untrained personnel (223 per100 000).
Conclusions The risk of heat illness was global, year-
round and showed dynamic local variation. Failure to dual-
report casualties impaired case ascertainment of heat
illness across Command and Medical chains. Current pre-
ventive guidance, as applied in training and on operations,
should be critically evaluated to ensure that risk of heat
illness is reduced as low as possible. Clear procedures for
casualty notiﬁcation and surveillance are required in
support of this and should incorporate communication
within and between the two reporting chains.
INTRODUCTION
The Joint Service Publication on Climatic Injuries
in the Armed Forces ( JSP 539) uses ‘heat illness’ to
describe incapacitation resulting from a rise in core
body temperature. Most episodes are considered
preventable.1 Notiﬁcation of military heat illness
casualties is crucial to effective force protection and
a dual mechanism of Command and Medical
reporting applies across the breadth of service
activities, in the both Firm Base and overseas. Since
its publication in 2003, JSP 539 has directed mili-
tary doctors to notify Army cases of heat illness to
the Army Health Unit (AHU), using a Heat Illness
Medical Reporting Form delivered by post or by
fax. This has facilitated aetiological and
epidemiological analysis of heat illness and
informed medical signiﬁcant event reporting.
Under UK statute, the Army is also required to
notify any episode of heat-induced illness as a
workplace incident.2 Commanders must return a
completed Ministry of Defence (MoD) Form 510
Accident Report to the Army Incident Notiﬁcation
Cell (AINC),3 which operates under the jurisdiction
of the Chief Environment and Safety Ofﬁcer
(CESO), Army, and sits with the Land Accident
Investigation Team (LAIT) at Army Headquarters.
Serious cases of heat illness should also be notiﬁed
to Defence Primary Healthcare (DPHC) in the
Firm Base and to Permanent Joint Headquarters
(PJHQ) for operational deployments (Box 1).
Two decades have passed since the burden of UK
military heat illness was systematically surveyed.4–6
Dickinson4 used discharge coding from military hos-
pital episodes to identify 1448 personnel affected by
heat illness in all three services between 1981 and
1994. The British Army rate was determined to be
71 per 100 000 personnel or 118 hospitalisations per
year and included 11 fatalities attributable to the
effects of heat (0.6 per 100 000 personnel or one
death per year). During the same period, the ratio of
hospitalised to non-hospitalised (ambulatory) cases
was approximately 7:3 for army heat illness reported
in the UK.5 6 Following a review of preventive prac-
tices and changes in Defence policy, the incidence of
heat illness was thought to have fallen7 8 and the
Box 1 Examples of serious heat illness
incidents that require Medical notiﬁcation to
Defence Primary Healthcare or Permanent
Joint Headquarters1
A. Any fatality.
B. Any hospitalisation for clinical reasons for
climatic injury.
C. Any aeromedical evacuation for climatic injury.
D. Any incidence of climatic injury sufﬁcient to
require downgrading.
E. Any incident involving multiple climatic
casualties.
F. Any individual suffering recurrent climatic injury
(as a distinct repeat event, not part of the same
initial episode).
G. Any unusual or atypical events (eg, climatic
casualties occurring when the risk assessment
deemed this unlikely).
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Surgeon General’s Heat Illness Working Group (SG’s HIWG) was
established to regularly review and update the guidance in JSP
539, using subject matter experts drawn from across the UK
military.
Yet life-threatening and fatal cases of heat illness have continued
to affect the Army in training9 and on deployed operations.10
Though high-proﬁle incidents may lead to improvements in aware-
ness and reporting practices, it has been suggested that heat illness
remains under-reported in the modern era.1 11 This view is sup-
ported by evidence of under-reporting in other contemporaneous
disease surveillance systems and from the deployed environment
in Afghanistan.12 13 To address this issue, heat illness notiﬁcations
to the AHU and AINC were examined for the 5-year period
2009–2013. The primary aim was to determine the proportion of
casualties notiﬁed to both Command and Medical chains, that is,
the concordance of reporting. The secondary aim was to character-
ise the burden of suspected heat illness, by identifying when,
where and to what extent different parts of the army were
affected. It was not intended to evaluate the absolute number of
heat illness cases diagnosed in the UK military, which is a task
undertaken annually by Defence Statistics Health (DSH). A deﬁni-
tive analysis of worldwide hospitalisation rates, requiring informa-
tion from disparate civilian and military secondary care providers,
was also beyond the scope of the study.
METHODS
The permission of the British Army Caldicott Guardian was
secured for a secondary analysis of databases held by the AHU
and AINC. The databases were anonymised and searched to
identify all reports of suspected heat illness affecting Army per-
sonnel between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2013.
Reservist personnel from the Volunteer and Regular Reserves
were included in the analysis; those from the Sponsored Reserve
and University Ofﬁcer Training Corps were not.
For each report the date, referring unit and location of the
incident were recorded, in addition to details of the casualty’s
military unit, the activity being undertaken at the time of the
incident and any clinical treatment provided or outcome such as
ﬁrst-aid provision or hospital emergency department attend-
ance. Where incidents had occurred around the same time
(±72 h) and in similar circumstances, military Service numbers
were requested and compared so that identical episodes of heat
illness would not be included twice in the analysis. A separate
check of Service numbers was conducted to assess for disease
recurrence, deﬁned as a second episode of heat illness occurring
within 60 days of the index episode.14
Descriptive data were summarised for the composite series.
Reports were categorised as from training (TNG), ﬁeld (FLD) or
operationally deployed (DEP) units. The time and the location
of the incident were speciﬁed, by month, year and geographical/
strategic region. Reports concerning full-time Army personnel,
including Gurkhas and individuals in the Full Time Reserve
Service, were denoted FULL. Reports concerning members of
the Army Reserve, including the Regular Reserve and the
Volunteer Reserve (formerly known as the Territorial Army),
were denoted A-RES. Reports were also differentiated according
to the casualty’s training status. Recruit (RCT) referred to
someone undergoing initial or special-to-Arm/Service training
and included Ofﬁcer Cadets at the Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst. Only TNG notiﬁed RCT casualties, whereas trained
personnel were employed in all referring locations, including
TNG. Where reporting information had been omitted, ‘not
reported’ (NR) was the category assigned.
RESULTS
The AHU database contained 326 Medical reports of heat
illness. Five of these described an individual affected by heat
illness for the second time during the period surveyed, but only
one report met criteria for recurrence and the others were
retained for analysis. The AINC database contained 315
Command notiﬁcations of heat illness and no episodes of recur-
rence. Concordance of reporting to the AHU and AINC was
seen in 75 cases (150 of 651 reports), the details of which were
merged to generate a composite series of 565 unique cases.
Concordance ranged from 9.6% to 16.5% in each year and the
overall rate was 13.3%.
Figure 1A shows annual reporting submitted to the AHU
only, to the AINC only or to both. The average number of heat
illness reports was 113 and varied from 83 reports in 2012 to
147 reports in 2010. Figure 1B displays total reports by month.
The month of July saw the greatest number of heat illness
reports (138 cases or 24.4% of total reports) and the highest
concordance in total reporting (30%). The nadir of reporting
was December, with two cases notiﬁed to the AHU alone. The
highest frequency months were April to September inclusive,
during which 465 notiﬁcations of heat illness were made
(82.3% of total reporting).
Figure 2A displays annual reporting of heat illness from the
UK and non-UK (overseas) locations. In the composite series,
343 reports originated in the UK (60.7%), 221 reports came
from overseas (39.1%) and one location was not recoded.
Concordance of reporting to the AHU and AINC was higher
for cases that occurred in the UK than for heat illness notiﬁed
from overseas (17.1% vs 12.8%). Total reporting by year and
region is displayed in Table 1.
Figure 2B, C displays monthly reporting by location for the
years 2010 and 2013, respectively. In 2010, 71.6% of heat
illness was reported for the April to September period and half
of cases were from overseas. By contrast, nearly three quarters
Figure 1 A total of 565 consecutive reports of heat illness to the Army
Health Unit (AHU) and Army Incident Notiﬁcation Cell (AINC), 2009–
2013. Displayed by (A) year and (B) month.
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of 2013 reporting described UK incidents and April to
September accounted for 93.0% of total notiﬁcations.
Heat illness from TNG accounted for 62.8% of total reports
and affected untrained (RCT) personnel as well as trained, such
as permanent staff and those held temporarily on strength for
selection, promotion and specialist courses. Reporting from
FLD (28.5%) and DEP (6.0%) described trained casualties only.
All DEP notiﬁcations came from Southern Afghanistan.
Reporting by TNG demonstrated greater concordance (16.1%)
than reporting by FLD (10.6%) and by DEP (0%).
Annual reporting rates for heat illness are presented by mili-
tary employment category in Figure 3. Concordance was similar
between FULL and A-RES cases (12.3% vs 12.9%). At the time
of writing, adequate 5-year manning statistics were available for
trained and untrained FULL strengths.15 Complete denominator
data for A-RES were available for 2012 and 2013 only and did
not differentiate training status.16 Excluding A-RES reports
from 2009 to 2011 and reports where employment status was
NR, the 5-year rate of suspected heat illness was 76 cases per
100 000 Army personnel. For the years 2012 and 2013, the
respective rates were 50 and 72 per 100 000 Army personnel.
The annual rate of reported heat illness varied widely with the
population at risk, however, from 21 per 100 000 (A-RES in
2012) up to 253 per 100 000 (FULL untrained strength
in 2013). Annual reporting rates were greater in FULL than in
A-RES personnel (87 vs 23 per 100 000) and, in the FULL
population, greater for the RCT than the trained strength (223
vs 59 per 100 000).
DISCUSSION
This evaluation of Army-wide heat illness reporting is the ﬁrst
to appear in the literature since preventive practices were
reviewed in the mid-1990s. Since then, epidemiological reports
of heat illness in the UK military have been limited to shorter
Figure 2 Heat illness reporting (UK vs overseas): (A) annual reporting, 2009–2013, (B) monthly reporting, 2010 and (C) monthly reporting, 2013.
AHU, Army Health Unit; AINC, Army Incident Notiﬁcation Cell; NR, not reported.
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case series of troops hospitalised and conﬁned during training17
and operations in the Middle East.18–22 While these accounts
reﬂect major operational commitments at the beginning of the
21st century, our results suggest they should be considered in a
wider reporting context, with hospitalisations on deployment
making up only part of the overall picture.
This is also the ﬁrst heat illness review to be published since
the introduction in 2007 of electronic primary care records,
which are now the primary means for identifying heat illness to
DSH. The requirement for single service reporting was phased
out in 2014 and the AHU presently receives Heat Illness
Medical Reporting Forms only where incidents cannot be elec-
tronically recorded within 28 days. These evolving changes may
have affected how the Medical decision to report was applied in
2013, resulting in under-reporting of heat illness to the AHU
and perhaps contributing to our key ﬁnding: that concordance
of heat illness notiﬁcations to the AHU and AINC was poor.
Between January 2009 and December 2013, a comparable
number of suspected heat illness cases were notiﬁed to each
organisation (325 vs 315). Yet only 23% of Medically reported
casualties were notiﬁed to the AINC and the AHU was
informed about just 24% of Command-notiﬁed incidents, result-
ing in a failure rate of 86.7% for dual reporting.
In general, concordance of reporting was greater where the
volume of notiﬁed heat illness was higher, such as during the
month of July, in training establishments and among recruits to
the full-time Army. Heat illness casualties were notiﬁed in larger
numbers from the UK than from overseas and UK cases were
also more likely to be dual reported. Even in the best-
performing domains, dual reporting occurred in less than half
of cases and peaked at just 40.5% in training reports from July
2013. Among referring units, the greatest overall concordance
was seen in reporting from TNG, which also generated the
greatest number reports. The higher rates of RCT heat illness in
our series may therefore represent enhanced awareness of, and
engagement with, reporting requirements in TNG, rather than
truly increased risk of heat illness relative to FLD and DEP.
There are other reasons to suspect this. Units that are respon-
sible for the delivery of training are expected to model best
practice, which would include compliance with reporting
requirements, and key Command and Medical appointments in
TNG are often assigned to personnel with greater experience
and seniority than in FLD and DEP, which may also reinforce
appropriate reporting.
Familiarity with the mechanisms available for reporting heat
illness may have a greater impact upon adherence to this require-
ment than for notiﬁable disorders more commonly encountered
in the military, such as gastrointestinal and respiratory tract infec-
tions.13 23 It is likely that where cases are infrequently encoun-
tered, individuals will be less practised at recognising heat illness
and will rightly err on the side of overdiagnosis. This is one of
Figure 3 Annual rates of heat illness, 2009–2013 in (A) full-time
(FULL) trained personnel, (B) FULL recruits and (C) members of the
Army Reserve, trained and untrained strengths. AHU, Army Health Unit;
AINC, Army Incident Notiﬁcation Cell; NR, not reported.
Table 1 Total heat illness reporting to the AHU and AINC
(2009–2013), by region of incident: Afghanistan (AFG), Brunei, Asia
and the Middle East (BRU), Cyprus and Southern Europe (CYP),
Germany (GER), North America (NAM), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
and United Kingdom (UK)
Location 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
AFG 16 7 9 2 0 34
BRU 5 25 0 10 5 45
CYP 9 4 6 3 6 28
GER 5 10 5 6 8 34
NAM 10 13 10 8 10 51
SSA 5 14 6 3 0 28
UK 63 75 69 51 85 343
NR 1 0 0 0 1 2
AHU, Army Health Unit; AINC, Army Incident Notification Cell; NR, not reported.
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the reasons that we expect reporting to the AHU and the AINC
to have included episodes of incapacity that masqueraded as heat
illness, but were not, such as disturbances of metabolic or cardiac
origin. Command notiﬁcations to the AINC are more likely to
have featured this bias to over-reporting than those submitted by
Medical personnel to the AHU, because of clinical acumen and
additional information—such as ultimate patient outcome—
available to the latter. But while overdiagnosis could account for
cases notiﬁed to AINC but not to the AHU, this fails to explain
why so many Medically notiﬁed heat illness episodes were NR by
Commanders. An inputting back-log is known to have affected
reporting to AINC for the 12-month period April 2012 to
March 2013,3 but would not account for the lack of concordance
in preceding years. On the basis of this ﬁnding, Command ascer-
tainment of heat illness must be considered subject to signiﬁcant
under-reporting bias. This raises concern for the ability of CESO
(Army) to mitigate future heat illness by accident investigation,
for the British Army to implement preventive strategies based on
lessons learnt and for legislative requirements to be fulﬁlled
satisfactorily.
Deﬁnitive clinical outcomes cannot be derived from the
reporting data presented above, but published statistics from the
past three ﬁnancial years suggest that the historical ‘hospitalised:
ambulatory’ ratio of 7:3 could reasonably be applied to our
series.24 This estimates the contemporary hospitalisation rate to
be 60 cases per 100 000 FULL personnel, which is only 11
fewer hospitalisations per 100 000 personnel per year than in
the 1981–1991 period. A more conservative ﬁgure of 38 hospi-
talisations per 100 000 FULL personnel derives from Medical
notiﬁcations only and provides a lower limit for the expected
reduction in heat illness hospitalisations. Accepting either rate is
a challenge to the view of military heat illness as a preventable
disorder and calls into question the efﬁcacy of the guidance pro-
vided in JSP 539, as presently applied by the British Army.
Improving the accuracy of diagnosis for heat illness, both in
ambulatory settings and in secondary care, would remove some
of the confounding associated with overdiagnosis, such that
reporting might better reﬂect the true Service burden of heat
illness. In particular, diagnosis of cases where elevated core tem-
perature was suspected, but not conﬁrmed by measurement
proximal to the point of incapacitation, would be aided by a test
with high speciﬁcity for prior body heat storage. If a sensitive
point-of-care solution could be developed in response to this
challenge, the improved accuracy of diagnosis might also beneﬁt
Medical decision making and could help to improve clinical and
occupational outcomes.
Like the majority of cases reported to the AHU and AINC,
most episodes of heat illness arose during the Northern hemi-
sphere summer. In the UK, average temperatures peak in July25
and this month accounted for a quarter of all notiﬁcations.
Three heat-attributed deaths occurred on a military selection
course in Wales during July 2013,26 which was the third
warmest July on record.27 Both the AHU and AINC registered a
high number of heat illness notiﬁcations from the UK that
month and, while excess reporting may have arisen due to
heightened awareness and overdiagnosis, true heat-related mor-
bidity is also likely to have increased with the abrupt rise in
environmental temperature at the beginning of the month. This
followed extended winter conditions, the coldest Spring in
50 years and a cool June.28 Acclimatisation to a hot environ-
ment requires several days of activity in equivalent condi-
tions,1 such that UK-based personnel would have been
vulnerable to the ﬁrst days of the heat wave. The future tac-
tical29 and strategic30 31 importance of the environment and
extreme weather events is increasingly apparent and the need
for dynamic assessment of the risk of heat illness must be
emphasised. The events of July 2013 serve as a tragic
reminder of historical heat illness commentary, that ‘an
average of one death per year…renders complacency
impossible’.8
Reporting from warmer climates was of greater signiﬁcance in
2010, when annual notiﬁcations from the Brunei, Asia and the
Middle East (BRU) surpassed any other overseas locations in
any year of the series (Table 1). A signiﬁcant number of
Medically reported cases were associated with jungle training
and selection courses in February and March (Figure 2B), but
do not appear to have been Command notiﬁed. The reasons for
this lack of concordance are unclear, though the arduous nature
of training in BRU may have meant that unwell personnel were
removed altogether from the training environment and from
under local Command, via the Medical chain. Permanent TNG
staff may have inadvertently overlooked the extant Accident
Reporting requirement, meaning that AINC and LAITwere not
alerted to incidents involving heat illness. The exact reasons for
the excess of heat-related morbidity in BRU in 2010 are also
unclear, but given that elevated heat and humidity are the
norm for jungle training, the activity level and clothing state
selected by Commanders would have warranted scrutiny. It is
remarkable that in the following reporting year, 2011, there
were no reports of heat illness at all from BRU. It is not
known whether this reﬂected changes in local training or noti-
ﬁcation procedures, but in the absence of investigation by
LAIT, the scope for Service-wide and Defence-wide learning
and improved prevention would have been very limited. More
recent Medical reporting of heat illness from BRU has been
exemplary and has shown evidence of liaison with local
Commanders, including conﬁrmation that an Accident Report
(MoD Form 510) has been sent and LAIT appropriately
involved. Cross-checking of this nature should be integrated
into future iterations of the electronic Medical template and
Commanders should be encouraged to ensure that Medical
personnel are also made aware of less severe cases that, for
whatever, reason, do not present formally for clinical
assessment.
Finally, comparison of reporting rates between FULL and
A-RES was limited by non-availability of key information for
the period addressed by the study, including the known strength
of A-RES. For the years 2012 and 2013, denominator data were
available for both FULL and A-RES (Regular and Volunteer)
strengths. Less than 2% of notiﬁcations in the series concerned
Regular Reservists, who are former FULL personnel retaining a
liability to be called-up in times of service need. The incorpor-
ation of this large group, which may be exposed to relatively
little military activity, likely had a dilutional effect upon the risk
of heat illness calculated for A-RES. It will also have impacted
on the overall Army rates, which would be higher if the denom-
inator was restricted to those actively engaged in Army duties.
The relatively low incidence of heat illness in A-RES may also
reﬂect under-reporting to the AHU, as the majority of A-RES
cases in the series were Command notiﬁed. As Reservist roles
expand and mature within the Force, it is important that
Medical providers to the A-RES are fully conversant with all
aspects of JSP 539, including requirements for reporting heat
illness.
CONCLUSIONS
Heat illness poses a persisting threat to the British Army. It has
the capacity to degrade operational effectiveness by causing
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morbidity and occasional mortality in all environments and
among all sectors of the Force, including Reservists and recruits.
The dual mechanism of Command and Medical notiﬁcation
exists to reduce the risk of future heat illness, by identifying how
preventive practices can be improved and policy implemented.
Accurate and timely information must be provided to each
reporting chain to fulﬁl the Command requirements of legislative
compliance and accident investigation and the Medical functions
of epidemiological surveillance and aetiological analysis.
Reporting requirements have been clariﬁed in this article.
We have also shown that Command and Medical systems
under-report heat illness when applied in isolation and we
suggest better integration as a means to their improvement. At
unit level, Commanders and Medical personnel should commu-
nicate to ensure that heat illness casualties are mutually notiﬁed
to AINC, DSH and DPHC/PJHQ. This process could be sup-
ported by including formal conﬁrmation of the Command/
Medical interaction in the submission of heat illness reports.
The organisations tasked with receiving and acting upon this
reporting should also maintain open lines of communication
and use established fora, such as SG’s HIWG, to optimise sur-
veillance for heat illness. The responsibility for promulgating
and supporting up-to-date Medical reporting practices lies with
the single Services and the AHU remains the Army point of
contact for any issues that may arise in relation to this. The
guidance in JSP 539 continues to set the standards for best prac-
tice in the prevention of heat illness, but its effective application
must be reviewed across the range of contemporary training and
operational settings if reductions in morbidity are to be achieved
and sustained in the Future Force.
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